Developing conventional ballistic missiles, Arkin misses the point

First, huge kudos to Arkin for pointing this out in his tin-foil-hat column "Early Warning." I used to think this was the mouthpiece for the paranoid conspiracy theorists. Now that so many of our leaders are clearly involved in conspiracy, (if you question this, please read some other blog), I believe these are conspiracy realists. That being said...

Arkin discusses the conversion of Trident missiles to conventional warheads from their current nuclear status. He discusses the motivations for this, and finds them largely to be financial, pushed by the defense contractors and STRATCOM. I strongly disagree.

Tony Capaccio of Bloomberg News has another scoop that probably portends the most important strategic military development of our generation.

Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld has given the Navy go ahead to develop a conventionally armed Trident missile. Two dozen existing nuclear-armed submarine-launched missiles will be converted to carry conventional warheads. The missiles will then be assigned "global strike" missions to allow quicker preemptive attacks.

For the first time since intercontinental ballistic missiles were "captured" in arms control treaties 40 years ago as unique and potentially destabilizing weapons, the United States will muddy the waters by modifying an existing nuclear weapon for use in day-to-day warfare.

The conversion of Trident missiles abandons the strict segregation of nuclear from conventional weapons.

Were the United States ever to use its new conventional Tridents, the firing would also flirt with accidental nuclear war. Ballistic missiles aimed at targets in North Korea, for example, might falsely signal to China or Russia that the United States was attacking them.

The arms control and strategic stability issues associated with this decision are momentous. But here is the tragic reality of opening this door: The United States just doesn't need the capability.

The fiscal year 2007-2011 Department of Defense budget plan calls for building 96 conventional warheads for 24 Navy Trident II missiles, according to a Dec. 20 memo signed by Deputy Defense Secretary Gordon England, Bloomberg reported. Each missile would carry up to four warheads.

U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM), which is the sponsor of the global strike program, says that the conventionally armed missiles will add to the ability "for delivering prompt, precise strike globally.''

"Increased precision may allow targets currently held at risk with nuclear weapons to be targeted with conventional weapons, providing options other than nuclear weapons for prompt global strike," STRATCOM says.

In English, STRATCOM is not only looking to improve its ability to attack deeply buried enemy command centers, but also to decrease its reliance on nuclear weapons.

On the surface, the impulse to find conventional alternatives to nuclear missions is laudable. Of course, we are hostage to accepting STRATCOM's calculations as to the need for nuclear weapons in the first place. These are purely physics calculations: We need so much tonnage and overpressure to penetrate this or that underground facility. Since we are required to provide a 90 percent probability of kill against these types of facilities, STRATCOM targeters and weaponeers argue, we need to develop other capabilities to reach those levels of guarantee. This same argument has been used to justify new nuclear-armed bunker buster weapons, but STRATCOM is not just pursuing one approach; conventionally armed Trident IIs is another approach to achieving the same goal.

Of course it isn't STRATCOM's task, nor the Navy's, to wrestle with the arms control and political implications of developing a conventionally armed ballistic missile. And the lack of foresight or restraint on such technological determinism has also stood in the way of investigating other less provocative methods.

For years, STRATCOM and the Air Force have been developing concepts to "functionally" defeat hard-to-get-to targets. Say there is a deeply underground facility that is deemed impervious to conventional attack: The concept of functional defeat investigates other methods, cyber warfare, special operations, a combination of conventional attack on access points and electrical power production that would disable or isolate the facility even if the bunker itself survived.

This is the cutting edge of the military's new "effects based" operations. For a set of difficult targets in countries like Iran and North Korea, functional defeat specialists are today looking at the overall construction and support network to figure out innovative attack methods, ones that not only would obviate the need for nuclear weapons, but would also break with the old-fashioned view that a military mission isn't completed until things are destroyed in a conventional sense.

So isn't it ironic that Donald Rumsfeld, the prophet of military transformation and the booster of an effects based approach is releasing a half a billion dollars to develop a provocative weapon that falls back on the old paradigm?

The reason is that Donald Rumsfeld is a weakling. For all his huffing and puffing, he can't say no to either the military or the defense contractors.

And Congress can't motivate itself to see that there are dozens of half a billion dollar programs like conventional Trident that add boutique weapons that constitute only the slightest increment of additional capabilities but with enormous potential implications.

Ok, lets discuss the real issue. The real issue was hit in paragraph 3. Using missiles that were designed to carry nuclear payloads ... but carrying conventional payloads, means we are blurring the distinction between nuclear and conventional warfare. Yes, I remember back in 2001 when Bush, & Co. said they were planning on developing a smaller nuclear device that could be used in pre-emptive attacks. Yes, I understand the distinction between depleted uranium and a radiological weapon. But as this distinction becomes more and more blurred, what is to say we don't include one very small "micro" nuclear weapon in a barrage including thousands of conventionally armed weapons, including hundreds of Tridents. One little nuke, targeted at something, say a reactor, may not get anyone's attention. No evidence would suggest it was anything other than the "core" melting down ... and just a very effective hit.

This is possibly the most frightening issue ever. The whole basis of mutually ensured self destruction precludes the idea that nuclear weapons could be used unilaterally, which is what has created the uneasy nuclear peace since 1945. One participant using a nuclear device, at any level would send a signal that it's OK TO USE NUKES WHEN YOUR MILITARY IS OVERTAXED.

Don't miss the real point here. Our military is weak. We can't occupy country of 20 million. What do you think will happen when we invade Iran, a country of 6x that population, with a real military, and weaponry? Well, that's why we want to use nukes. Because we are afraid our military will fail, and we will have our asses handed to us on a plate, so we have to resort to nukes. Because we are weak. Because instead of spending the money we need on armor for Humvees, extra infantry, more sophisticated field devices, we are spending our budget on conventional warheads for Tritan to blur the line. Weak. If we are itching for a fight, then, we need to fight like men. What would Eisenhower do? Even with his idea for an all nuclear arsenal, it was still for deterrence, not for attacking a non-nuclear state, which is why he never deployed such weapons in Korea. What would Teddy Roosevelt do? Please, this is not a partisan Liberal v. Conservative issue. What would Reagan do? Not follow this course, that is for certain.

1) Give our troops more armor, disability pay, health benefits (after they lose a limb)
2) Quit picking fights we can't win
3) Impeach George Bush. The military industrial complex reigns supreme.


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